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Colonial Comrades: Indonesian and Dutch
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In the early morning hours of Saturday 12
November 1926, Labuan, a small town on
Java’s west coast, woke in alarm to an attack
on the residence of a Javanese local official.
Several hundred men, some with firearms and
others with knives and cutlasses, had captured
the local official and his family. They forced
them to the house of his superior, the wedono,
or subdistrict head, chasing and killing several
policemen along the way. A shoot-out ensued
at the wedono’s office that left the wedono,
more policemen and a Dutch railway
supervisor dead. That same evening, armed
bands took to the streets of the colonial capital
Batavia, some 100 kilometres from Labuan.
They attacked the main prison in the north of
the city and captured the telephone exchange,
effectively cutting off communications.
The attacks created fear among the Dutch
and the urban middle classes as they were
organised under the banner of the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI – Communist Party of
Indonesia). Troops from the colonial army and
the constabulary were deployed immediately,
and, without much ado, were able to put down
the revolt and restore order in most places
within a few hours. After a few days everything
in West Java was ‘back to normal’. While similar
uprisings flared up in two or three other
districts of Java, the rest of the colony
remained unaffected.
What the PKI had planned as a major revolution
was in retrospect not much more than a series
of local disturbances that hardly threatened the
colonial power. Rather, it provided it with a
good reason to crush communism altogether in
the colony. On 17 November, all leading PKI
members who had not yet fled the country
were arrested; some days later many ordinary
members were captured as well. By the end of
the year, 13,000 communists had been taken
into custody. As it was impossible to give them
all a proper trial, a few ringleaders were
executed and the majority of the prisoners
released a few months later. However,
afteranother short-lived communist revolt
broke out in West Sumatra in January 1927, the
Governor-General exiled 1,400 so-called
diehards to a remote corner of the Indonesian
archipelago. The location chosen was Boven
Digoel, situated in the most eastern district of
New Guinea, near the border with the
Australian administered part of that island.
The news of the uprising took the Dutch
comrades at the Amsterdam headquarters of
the Communistische Partij Holland (CPH –
Netherlands Communist Party), completely by
surprise. Nevertheless, the party released a
statement on 16 November, that the revolt was
not a ‘communist plot’ but “a provocation by
the colonial authorities who want to destroy
communism in the colony.” It was the Party's
‘colonial experts’, communists who had
worked in Indonesia before, who inspired this
statement. However, within a few days, on 20
November, the Moscow-based Communist
International or Comintern, advised by
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Indonesian communists in Sumatra in the 1920s. (Collection IISG, Amsterdam)
Indonesian communists who had found refuge
in the Soviet Union, issued a manifesto that
“welcomed the revolutionary struggle of the
peoples of Indonesia, and pledged its total
support”. Furthermore, it incited the workers
of the world “to do everything in your power to
support them in their struggle”. Such divergent
reactions to what Indonesian communists
were trying to achieve laid bare some of the
tensions that existed between the comrades in
the mother country and those in the colony;
tensions that go back to the early days of the
PKI.
From the start, the Indonesian communist
movement had a double ancestry. Part of its
roots lay in the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union)
that was founded in 1911. The Sarekat Islam
rapidly had mass following, claiming
membership of nearly two million in 1918. By
1920 however, it had disintegrated into several
competing factions, one of which became the
left-wing organisation the ‘Red Sarekat Islam’,
and later becoming the Sarekat Rakyat (People’s
Union). The rest of the Indonesian communist
movement’s roots lay in the Indies Social-
Democratic Association (ISDV) that was
founded in 1914 by Dutch radical socialists
working in the colony.
The ISDV, originally a debating club, quickly
developed into a Marxist party, particularly
after the successful Russian Revolution. It was
based in the Central Java capital of Semarang,
the ‘Red City’ where most radical trade unions
had their headquarters. Its leadership
consisted of Dutch railway employees such as
Sneevliet and Baars; former military personnel
such as Bergsma and Brandsteder; but mostly
of primary and secondary school teachers. A
number of Indonesians joined them. Like the
Dutch members, the Indonesian members were
also mainly railway employees such as
Semaun, and school teachers like Tan Malaka,
Musso; with a number of journalists like
Alimin, Darsono, and Dengah. All the
Indonesian members were well educated and in
general from middle-class or aristocratic
backgrounds.
The colonial government kept a close watch
on these radikalinskis who propagated a
Russian-style revolution, and who changed
ISDV’s name in 1920 to Perserikatan
Kommunist di Hindia, (later becoming the PKI,
the Partai Komunis Indonesia). The Dutch
members of the party were gradually expelled
from the colony by government order:
Sneevliet and Baars were among the first. By
1923 the last Dutch activists had been expelled
from the Indies and sent home to the
Netherlands. However, their junior PKI
colleagues took over and embarked on a more
radical course by starting strikes among
railway personnel and sugar factory workers.
They also prepared for a head-on confrontation
with the government.
Most exiles found political refuge in the
CPH. As ‘colonial experts’ they formed a strong
pressure group in the Netherlands, sending
instructions and advice to their Indonesian
comrades. They were in a strong position to do
so as the Dutch party was assigned as the main
channel through which the Comintern,
communicated with the Indies – and through
which Russian funds could be transferred to
support the PKI. Such dependence by the PKI
upon their former ‘mentors’ – as the old ISDV
members called themselves – as well as the
latter’s committed but condescending attitude
in discussing PKI strategy, caused an endless
series of conflicts between the former
comrades-in-arms.
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Semaun and Darsono were also expelled from
the Indies in 1923, and had settled in Moscow.
They worked at the Comintern headquarters,
and from there often criticised the behaviour of
the CPH colonial experts. While Sneevliet and
Bergsma urged the PKI to cooperate with
Indonesian nationalists to form a broad popular
anti-colonial front, the PKI itself was heading in
a far more radical direction, attacking the
nationalists for being too easy-going vis-à-vis
the colonial government. The PKI leadership
was convinced that for the Dutch, their
movement was only an appendage to the CPH
and that the CPH did next to nothing to support
their Asian comrades. Semaun in particular
wrote bitterly about Sneevliet’s interference in
what he considered to be Indonesia’s own
affairs. He bore an even greater grudge against
Brandsteder:
“This Dutch comrade, who is so full of
ruling-race-superior-fancy worked only
among Dutch navy men and soldiers in
Indonesia, does not speak Malay, and
looked with disdain upon the brown
masses, the very stupid coolie class.”
and he ended his report to the Comintern by
asking:
“ ... to keep every sectarian Dutch
comrade away from the ranks of
Indonesian revolutionaries.”
Darsono, always more diplomatic in his
statements, was nonetheless similarly abrasive
in his comments upon Dutch paternalism. He
reported:
“The very fact that the leadership of the
Party was [from 1923 onwards] in the
hands of native comrades still further
raised the prestige of the Party in the
eyes of the masses, for we must not
forget that in a colonial country like
Indonesia, the masses are somewhat
prejudiced against the Dutch comrades.”
The PKI followed its own course, not listening
anymore to the avuncular recommendations of
their Dutch mentors. Its rapid success in
gaining a large following in West and Central
Java strengthened the self-confidence of the
leaders to go for revolutionary action. They did
this by first organising strikes – which mainly
failed – and later by underground actions and
preparation for a revolt. But, as we have seen,
the uprising was ill-planned, ill-prepared, and
ill-informed. Colonial intelligence agencies
already knew who the leaders of the revolution
were, had cracked the secret party code, and
had even been informed about the date of the
revolt. The government was thus able to act
immediately and eliminated the communist
threat.
The failed revolution was disastrous for the
PKI. In 1927 the party was dead, or at least in
a coma for decades to come. Its leaders had
either fled the country or were together with
the party’s cadres, ‘rotting away’ in the malaria
infested jungle of Boven-Digoel. Little was
heard from them until after Indonesia’s
declaration of Independence in 1945. Some
of the most prominent Indonesian
representatives at the Comintern office, such
as Semaun, Darsono and Tan Malaka, never
returned to the PKI, but took their own political
course.
There were similar developments on the
Dutch side. Several of the colonial experts in
the CPH, including Sneevliet, Baars and
Brandsteder, who had criticised the PKI and
who, after the failed revolt blamed the PKI for
not taking their advice, left the party in the late
1920s.
Apparently, it was only after the first
generation of ISDV leaders had left the stage,
that relations between Dutch and Indonesian
comrades could be decolonised.
A note on sources: This paper is primarily based on the work of Ruth
McVey (The Rise of Indonesian Communism [1965], from which most
quotations are taken); Jeanne Mintz (Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen:
The Roots of Indonesian Socialism [1965]); Gerrit Voerman, De
meridiaan van Moskou. De CPN en de Communistische Internationale,
1919-1931 [2001].
